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The paper describes an application of the probabilistic event oriented system analysis to the 
design of ship structural components with the aim to evoke the possible usage of reliability theo-
ries in the design practice. The basic concepts of events analysis and of system robustness are 
summarized at the beginning. The system robustness takes on the entropy concept in probability 
and information theory in order to ensure the most uniform distribution of safety of failure events 
of structural components in ship’s service. At the end, the paper presents in details an example 
of robustness maximization of a typical ship structural component under number of design failure 
criteria. The example corroborates that it is possible to ﬁ nd structural conﬁ guration with more 
uniform distribution of safety on the basis of robustness criteria.
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Kriteriji robustnosti za povećanje sigurnosti sastavnica brodskih 
konstrukcija
Izvorni znanstveni rad
Članak opisuje primjenu vjerojatnosne analize usmjerene događajima na projektiranje sastavnica 
brodskih konstrukcija u cilju prikaza mogućeg korištenja teorija pouzdanosti u praksi projektiranja. 
Na početku članka su ukratko opisani osnovni koncepti analize događaja i robustnosti sustava. 
Robustnost je prikazana preko entropije deﬁ nirane u teoriji vjerojatnosti i teoriji informacija s ciljem 
da se osigura naj-jednolikijom razdioba sigurnosti u odnosu na moguća oštećenja strukturnih 
sastavnica u službi broda. Na kraju članak detaljno prikazuje primjer maksimizacije robustnosti 
tipične strukturne sastavnice brodskog trupa podvrgnute projektnim kriterijima oštećenja. Primje-
rom se potvrđuje da je moguće naći strukturnu konﬁ guraciju s jednolikijom razdiobom sigurnosti 
na osnovi kriterija robustnosti.
Ključne riječi: robustnost, entropija, pouzdanost, projektiranje konstrukcija, brodske kon-
strukcije
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1 Introduction
More rational approach to safety assessment of ship structures 
by employing probability theory has resulted in involvement of 
reliability methods in the rules of classifi cation societies and 
thereby in the design practice [1]. The development of ship reli-
ability methods also has opened new possibilities for enhance-
ment of structural design process in combination with other 
theories [2]. The application of the event oriented system analysis 
(EOSA) [3, 4] to ship structures presented in this paper relies on 
the belief that a joint application of the theory of ship structures, 
classifi cation rules, probability theory, statistics and information 
theory can be benefi cial for safety of ship operations. The EOSA 
starts with considering the probabilities of random operational 
and failure events with the aim to estimate their uncertainties. 
The uncertainties of operations are put in a function of random 
design variables with respect to failure criteria involving loads, 
responses, geometry, material properties, corrosion etc. The aim 
of the EOSA is to consider structural behaviour as a system of 
events and defi ne measures for structural robustness and redun-
dancy by involving all relevant operational modes in service. 
These measures then provide the tool for maximization of the 
certainties of operations. The probabilistic system analysis is 
based on statistical data about physical components, environ-
mental effects and their interactions [5, 6]. In addition to the 
mere probabilistic analysis the aim of the EOSA is to account 
for all known, observable, or at least important lifetime events 
and their relations.
2  Event oriented system analysis
The observable outcomes associated with a component of an 
engineering system can be denoted as events. Distinguishable 
exclusive and inclusive events or common cause events are ran-
dom events denoted as basic events. The basic event may happen, 
when denoted A
i
, or not, when denoted A i ni e, , ,...,= 1 2 . The two 
possibilities are sometimes called simple alternatives. The n
e
 is 
the total number of basic events, not necessarily equal to the 
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number of components n
c
. The quantitative methods of system 
analysis require component operational data such as the prob-
ability of operation R p Ai i= ( )  and the probability of failure 
p p A p Af i i i, ( ) ( )= = −1 .
 The concept of entropy is known from earlier in the in-
formation theory [7]. The entropy of a single stochastic event A 
expresses unexpectedness of event and has a basic role in theory 
defi ned as:
 (1)
 
The ship structures consist of a large a number of structural 
components. The behaviour of structural components is described 
by compound random events E
i
 consisting of a certain combina-
tion of random events. Here, combinations such as for example 
buckling and yielding failures of a plating or stiffener could be 
accounted for. To investigate behaviour of a component, or an 
entire structure, one has to include all, or at least relevant com-
pound events and their probabilities. Such a collection of events 
constitutes a system of events. Systems of events are usually 
described as fi nite schemes [8]:
 
(2)
where p(Ei ), i=1,2,..., N are probabilities of occurrence of com-
pound events and N is the total number of all events constituting 
a system of events S. 
The EOSA categorizes events according to their status: op-
erational, Ei
o , and failure events Ei
f . The probabilities of events 
can hopefully be estimated through reliability approaches such 
as fi rst-order reliability method (FORM), advanced fi rst-order 
reliability method (AFORM) or by Monte Carlo simulation and 
Bayesian methods [5, 6]. 
A system S of N
o
 operational events and N
f
 failure events, 
where N = N
o
 +N
f
 can be written as:
 
(3)
The EOSA applies the entropy concept to assess the effects 
of the number of events and dispersion of their probabilities on 
uncertainties of operational and failure modes. The uncertainty 
of a whole system of events S is by defi nition [9]:
 
(4)
Events can be grouped into subsystems according to their 
operational O or failure F statuses:
 
(5)
 
(6)
where So is operational and Sf  is failure subsystem of events.
The system S can be presented as a sum of operational and 
failure subsystems as shown:
 
(7)
The overall reliability of the system corresponds to all of the 
outcomes when the system is operating and can be calculated as 
the probability of the subsystem of operational modes p(O):
 
(8)
The appropriate failure probability of the system corresponds 
to all of the outcomes when the system fails and can be calculated 
as the probability of the subsystem of failure modes p(F):
 
(9)
If all compound events and their probabilities are known, 
i.e. Σp(E
i
) = 1, the system of events is a complete one and the 
uncertainty of a system can be easily calculated as Shannon 
entropy [7]:
 
(10)
If there are some events whose probabilities cannot be cal-
culated or adequately assumed, the system of events is consid-
ered as incomplete, i.e. Σp(E
i
)<1. The entropy of an incomplete 
system of events is calculated as unconditional Renyi’s entropy 
of order α [10]:
 
(11)
where −∞ ≤ ≤ +∞ ≠α α, 1 .
Uncertainty measure of either incomplete or complete system 
of events follows from the Renyi’s entropy for a = 1 and is denoted 
as Renyi/Shannon’s entropy [3], as shown:
  
(12)
All logarithms applied to entropy calculations are usually of 
base two. The uncertainties are expressed in bits. For a = 0 from 
the Renyi’s entropy follows that maximum entropy as shown:
  
(13)
The relation of probability preservation holds either for 
complete or for incomplete systems S:
 (14)
It may be also noted that the sequence of the events within 
the system or within the subsystems is irrelevant for reliability 
and uncertainty considerations. The EOSA can be applied to 
any relations among subsystems, inclusive or exclusive and with 
dependent or independent events under the condition of adequate 
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partitioning of a system of events. Due to their complexity, the 
ship structural components will usually be modelled as incom-
plete systems of events [11].
2.1 Uncertainty associated with subsystems of 
events
The entropy of a whole system of events (4) has not been used 
in structural design since it does not provide enough information 
for comparison and validation of different operational and failure 
events. However, partitioning of systems of events to subsystems 
of interest (5, 6) and related calculation of conditional entropies 
have showed potential for application in structural design [12, 
13]. The uncertainty of a subsystem Si can be expressed as the 
Shannon’s entropy only of a partial probability distribution of the 
system S under the condition that the subsystem Si occurs. Such 
conditional entropy does not depend on the system probability 
p(S), being independent of whether the system S is complete or 
incomplete. The conditional entropy can be calculated:
   
(15)
where S
i
 is a subsystem of m
i
 events of the same status.
The maximal attainable conditional entropy of the subsystem 
Si is for m
i
 equally probable events:
  
 (16)
Relative uncertainty of systems S with same number of events 
is calculated as:
   
(17)
The average number of equally probable events, denoted 
FN
HNS S( ) = ( )2 , may be useful for practical purposes. The system 
S under the condition that it is operational O or failed F can be 
presented respectively, as fi nite schemes as it is shown:
Uncertainty of system S, under the condition that the system 
is operating is as shown:
 
(18)
Uncertainty of system S under the condition that the system 
is failing is as shown:
 
(19)
The entropy of the operational modes in (18) and of the fail-
ure modes in (19) depends only on the states of the subsystem 
of operational and failure modes, and not on any other state of 
the system. The maximal attainable entropy of system S under 
the condition that the system is operating is:
  
(20)
The maximal attainable entropy of system S under the condi-
tion that the system is failed is:
 
(21)
The operational and failure modes are of utmost interest both 
for the engineering system designers and for the system users. The 
subsystems of operational and failure modes can be considered 
on different levels of the hierarchical representation of the basic 
events with respect to their importance in system design. The 
uncertainties of operational and failure modes and their relations 
can be applied in the assessment of system performances. Fol-
lowing guidelines can be intuited:
– Higher entropy of operational modes is a consequence of a 
more uniform distribution of probabilities of operations and 
can indicate the increase of the system’s operational abun-
dance.
– Higher entropy of failure modes is a consequence of more 
uniform distribution of probabilities of failures and can be 
related to the increase of the endurance to failures, that is, 
increase of the system robustness.
2.2  Robustness deﬁ nition
EOSA can be applied to modelling of a component of ship 
structure as a system S composed of events E
i
 with associated 
probabilities p(E
i
). Description of a system includes functional 
levels and functional states. Initial or intact structure is viewed as 
the fi rst functional level. After failure of one or more structural 
components, the system transits from the fi rst level to subsequent 
levels. On each level one or more functional states are possible. 
States represent systems (subsystems) composed of modes in 
which a structural component performs its functions with full 
or with reduced capacity.
Robustness of a structural system requires concern in normal 
operations under working conditions if there are several opera-
tional and failure modes. The EOSA comprehends robustness as 
the system’s capability to respond to all possible random failures 
uniformly [9]. A robust behaviour is intuited when the system 
can provide more adequate failure modes to adverse demands 
with equal failure probabilities. When the system responds to 
all demands uniformly, there is a high uncertainty about which 
of the failure modes could occur. The EOSA relates robustness 
only to the uncertainty of the conditional entropy of a subsystem 
of failure events [9]:
  (22)
3  Events in ship structures
Traditionally, ship structures are analyzed within empirical, 
semi-empirical and partially theoretically based rules of clas-
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sifi cation societies. Ship’s hull basically consists of watertight 
hull plating and supporting substructures in the bottom, framing, 
decks, bulkheads, superstructures, etc. Ship structures subjected 
to random environmental and operational conditions are defi ned 
in the design process by their topology, geometry, scantlings of 
components and by material properties that are altogether con-
sidered as random variables when reliability methods [5, 6] and 
EOSA [9, 12, 13] are being applied.
Typical failure modes considered in structural analysis of 
steel ships can be divided into three groups [14]: large plastic 
deformations (yield), buckling and rupture (fatigue). Each of 
these types of failure includes several different damage states that 
differ according to seriousness with respect to the survivability 
criteria. Failure modes are determined for critical locations in 
ship structure based on knowledge from mechanics, theory of 
structures and engineering experience incorporated in the rules. 
Appropriate mathematical models defi ne single failure modes 
in the space of relevant basic variables X. Basic variables X = 
(X
1
,...,X
n
), where n is number of stochastic variables characterize 
structural behaviour by limit state functions g(X). Limit state 
functions are determined by traditional deterministic approach 
with mandatory identifi cation and quantifi cation of uncertain 
parameters.
For each structural component in ship structures, there are 
normally more failure states related to it. Complex structure col-
lapses when several important components are fully or partially 
damaged in the sequence, gradually reducing the load carrying 
capability also involving possible redistribution of loads on re-
maining components [6]. The following example will illustrate 
the application of EOSA to the assessment of scantlings of a 
longitudinal deck stiffener on a tanker based on robustness maxi-
mization criterion according to the failure criteria defi ned by the 
rules of DNV classifi cation society for stiffened panels [15].
4  Example: robustness assessment of a 
tanker deck longitudinal
Deck stiffener of a tanker ‘Barents Sea’ (Figure 1) built in 
Brodosplit Shipyard (Table 1) was considered.
Table 1   Main characteristics of the tanker Barents Sea
Tablica 1  Glavne značajke tankera Barents Sea
Loa = 182.5 m – length overall
Lpp = 174.8 m – length between perpendiculars
D = 17.5 m – moulded depth
B = 31.4 m – moulded breadth
T = 12.20 m – scantling draught
ZD = 16.14 m
3 – hull girder section modulus (deck)
v = 15 kn – speed
Cb = 0.80 – displacement coefﬁ cient
DWT (Δ) = 47400 tdw – deadweight
zNL = 7.552 m – distance of NL from baseline
Deck stiffener is located at midship section (Figure 1). It 
is a typical longitudinal stiffener built of HP profi le (Figure 2) 
with h
w
 = 220 mm, t
w
 = 11.5 mm and effective plate fl ange width 
b
e
 = 800 mm determined according to [15]. Deck plating thick-
ness is t
p
 = 14 mm.
Figure 2  Deck stiffener
Slika 2  Uzdužnjak palube
h w
t p
Figure 1  Stiffener location on the tanker deck
Slika 1  Položaj uzdužnjaka na palubi tankera
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Still-water bending moment (sagging condition), M
S1
, was 
taken from the loads and stability manual of the ship and amounts 
to M
S1
 = – 296250 kNm. Wave bending moments for sagging 
(M
W1
) and hogging (M
W2
) in the area 0.4 to 0.65L from aft per-
pendicular are: M
W1
 = –1446252 kNm and M
W2
 = 1332070 kNm. 
Calculated deck pressure is: p
2
 = 13.6 kN/m2 [15].
These values are assumed to be the mean values of random 
load variables. Statistical data of load random variables (Table 
2) can be found in [16, 17].
Table 2  Characteristics of load random variables in robustness calculation
Tablica 2 Svojstva slučajnih varijabli opterećenja za proračun robustnosti
Mean Distribution COV
Still-water bending moment (sagging) MS1 kNm 296250 Normal 0.4
Still-water bending moment (hogging) MS2 kNm 37570 Normal 0.4
Wave bending moment (sagging) MW1 kNm 1446252 Gumbel 0.09
Wave bending moment (hogging) MW2 kNm 1332070 Gumbel 0.09
Deck pressure p2 kN/m
2 13.6 Normal 0.09
Table 3  Characteristics of geometry random variables in robustness calculation
Tablica 3  Svojstva slučajnih geometrijskih varijabli za proračun robustnosti
Mean Distribution COV
Plating thickness tp mm 14.0 Normal 0.01
Web height hw mm 22.0 Normal 0.02
Web thickness tw mm 11.5 Normal 0.02
Cross sectional area A cm2 32.3 -
Moment of inertia (without deck plating) I cm4 1542.0 -
Effective ﬂ ange width be mm 800.0 Normal 0.01
Section modulus (with be) Wu cm
3 326.3 Log-Normal 0.04
Span l m 5.08 -
Spacing b m 0.8 -
Midship section modulus (deck) WD m
3 16.14 Log-Normal 0.04
Table 4  Material characteristics (mild shipbuilding steel)
Tablica 4  Svojstva materijala (običan brodograđevni čelik)
Mean Distribution COV
Yield stress σF N/mm
2 235.0 Log-Normal 0.06
Young's modulus E N/mm2 206000 Normal 0.01
4.1 Failure types and limit state functions
According to the DNV rules the failure types for a deck 
longitudinal are: 1. torsional buckling, 2. local buckling, 3. yield 
due to pressure and 4. fatigue damage. Stresses are calculated ac-
cording to the DNV rules with included uncertainties of random 
variables. Stress in the deck due to bending moments for sagging 
σ
a1
 and hogging, σ
a2
, is: σ
a1
 = 127.9 N/mm2 and σ
a2
 = 84.8 N/mm2. 
These stresses should not be greater than 0.6σ
F
. Critical buckling 
stress (lateral) is: σ
c1
 = 196.0 N/mm2. Critical buckling stress 
(torsion) is: σ
c2
 = 179.3 N/mm2. Critical buckling stress (local 
web buckling) is: σ
c3
 = 234.7 N/mm2.
For critical buckling stresses, σ
ci
 the following condition must 
be fulfi lled: σ
c
 ≥ (σ
a
/η), where factor η is defi ned as η = 0.85 for 
lateral buckling, η = 0.9 for torsional buckling and η = 1.1 for lo-
cal web buckling. Stress in the deck due to pressure on the deck: 
σ
p
 = 76.4 N/mm2. These calculated values are taken as mean 
values of random variables, following log-normal distribution 
with COV 0.07 according to [17]. Fatigue damages for structural 
detail considered in the example were calculated by ShipRight 
FDA program [18]. 
Limit states functions for failure types in ship structures are 
calculated according to:
                    g(X)= x
u
Wσ
cr
 – x
s
M
s
 – x
w
x
s
M
w  
(23)
where x are the uncertainties of adequate random variables for 
load and strength (Table 5). These are also modelled as random 
variables according to [19]. W is corresponding section modulus 
and σ
cr
 is critical stress of considered failure type. The following 
limit state functions can be written according to the failure types 
considered in this example:
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           g
1
 = W
D
⋅σ
c2
⋅x
u
 – 1.11⋅M
S1
⋅x
SW  
– 1.11⋅M
W1
⋅x
w
⋅x
S
 (24a)
            g
2
 = W
D
⋅σ
c3
⋅x
u
 – 0.9⋅M
S1
⋅x
SW   
– 0.9⋅ M
W1
⋅x
w
⋅x
S
 (24b)
         g
3
 = min [(225f
1
 – 130f
2d
)⋅x
u
 – σ
p
, (160f
1
⋅x
u
 – σ
p
)] (24c)
      (24d)
where f
1
 = 1.0 for mild shipbuilding steel, f
2d
 = 5.7 (M
S1
 + M
W1
) 
/W
D
, assumed service period of shipτ = 20 years, and T = 107 
years is the fatigue lifetime as calculated by ShipRight FDA.
Table 5   Random uncertainty variables x [19]
Tablica 5  Slučajne varijable neizvjesnosti x [19]
Mean Distribution COV
Uncertainty of still-water 
bending moment xs 1.0 Normal 0.05
Uncertainty of wave 
bending moments due to 
linear analysis approach
xw 0.9 Normal 0.15
Other uncertainties in 
wave bending moments xsw 1.15 Normal 0.03
Uncertainties in strength 
determination xu 1.0 Normal 0.15
4.3  EOSA of the deck longitudinal
For the purpose of simplicity it is assumed here that the stiff-
ener has no reduced carrying capacity at all. Then the considered 
system of events is a typical series system, since occurrence of 
any failure event causes the system to fail. The series system 
describing stiffener’s behaviour has n = 4 basic operational 
events A
i
 representing functional status of undamaged stiff-
ener. There are also four complement events A1 = tor.buckling , 
A2 = local buckling , A3 = yield  and A4 = fatigue , represent-
ing damaged (i.e. failed) stiffener. Number of compound events 
is then: N = 2n = 16. Reliability indexes β
Ai
 and probabilities 
of failure p
f
 (A
i
), i = 1,2,…,4, are calculated by AFORM [5, 6] 
procedure on a computer:
  β
A1
 = 1.339; p
f
 (A
1
) = 0.902×10–1
  β
A2
 = 3.441; p
f
 (A
2
) = 0.289×10–3
  β
A3
 = 3.348; p
f
 (A
3
) = 0.406×10–3
  β
A4
 = 5.281; p
f
 (A
4
) = 0.639×10–7
System of events S describing behaviour of the stiffener will 
be modelled as series system of events. It can be presented by a 
fi nite scheme as follows:
 
By AFORM procedure the probabilities of compound events 
can be calculated. Joint events of 3 or more basic events can be 
neglected according to [6] due to small probabilities of occur-
rences. Considering that, the stiffener can now be modelled as 
a system of 11 compound events and presented by the fi nite 
scheme as follows:
where E
i
 are compound events of the following statuses:
E
1
0  – operational event (undamaged stiffener)
E
1,1
  – failure (torsional buckling)
E
2,2
  – failure (local buckling)
E
3,3
  – failure (yield)
E
4,4
  – failure (fatigue)
E
1,2
  – failure (torsional and local buckling)
E
1,3
  – failure (torsional buckling and yield)
E
1,4
  – failure (torsional buckling and fatigue)
E
2,3
  – failure (local buckling and yield)
E
2,4
  – failure (local buckling and fatigue)
E
3,4
  – failure (yield and fatigue)
System’s failure probability S is (9): p f S( ) =  0.09. Reliability 
of systems S (8): R p EoS( ) = ( ) =1  0.91. Entropies (uncertainties) 
of a system are calculated according to (10): H(S) =  0.445 (3.459; 
0.128). where values in brackets represent maximum and rela-
tive entropies respectively. System robustness is (22): ROB (S) 
= 0.804. Maximum attainable robustness (21): ROB (S)
max
 = log 
(11) = 3.322. Relative robustness can be expressed as: rob (S) = 
ROB (S) / ROB (S)
max
 = 0.242.
4.4 Robustness analysis
Robustness of the deck longitudinal is analyzed as a system 
of events in order to determine maximum achievable robust-
ness, i.e. the most uniform distribution of failure probabilities 
(Figure 3) of interest in tanker design [20]. The following design 
constraints were applied:
– Constant weight, i.e. constant cross sectional 
A = 144.3 cm2
– Reliability value at least as reliability of the initial model 
(R ≥ 0.91).
A study was conducted to investigate robustness as a function 
of plate fl ange width b
e
 (stiffener spacing). Additional constraints 
applied in this study were:
– 600 mm < b
e
 < 900 mm and
– 12 mm < t
p
 < 16 mm.
Figure 3   Comparison of robustness and reliability of ship struc-
tural component  
Slika 3  Usporedba robustnosti i pouzdanosti sastavnice brod-
ske konstrukcije
The study next calculates the maximally attainable robustness 
of the stiffener depending on two design variables: web height h
w
 
g T4 = − τ
S = ( ) ( ) ( )
⎛
⎝⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
E E E
p E p E p E
o f f
o f f
1 2 16
1 2 16
...
...
⎟⎟
1763(2012)1, 11-17
ROBUSTNESS CRITERIA FOR SAFETY ENHANCEMENT OF SHIP'S STRUCTURAL... B. BLAGOJEVIĆ, K. ŽIHA
and web thickness t
w
, within reasonable engineering assumptions 
formulated by the following design constraints (Figure 4):
A = const.,
210 mm < h
w
 < 230 mm,
R > 0.91.
Figure 4   Maximum robustness (ROB) of a tanker deck stiffener
Slika 4  Maksimalna robustnost (ROB) uzdužnjaka palube tank-
era
The maximal robustness ROB
max
=0.85 is obtained for stiff-
ener web height of 216 millimetres (Figure 4).
Conclusion
The application of the event oriented system analysis to ship 
structures requires the knowledge about all the events and their 
probabilities of occurrence as well as their relation to the set of 
design variables and limit state functions. When some probabili-
ties cannot be determined, or their infl uence can be neglected, the 
structural behaviour can be modelled by incomplete systems of 
events. The current state of applications of probabilistic reliability 
methods in shipbuilding allow the assessments of probabilities 
of operational and failure modes as well the systemic analysis 
of their interactions. The usefulness of the event oriented system 
analysis is in the way the uncertainties of operational and failure 
modes are treated and applied for design purposes in improve-
ment of structural system robustness and redundancy.
The example indicated that the criterion of conditional en-
tropy of subsystem of failure events may provide more uniform 
distribution of safety at the same level of reliability of ship struc-
tural components that is interpretable as the increase, even as the 
maximum, of the structural robustness (Figures. 3 and 4). Thus, 
the property of robustness in terms of the EOSA distinguishes dif-
ferent structural confi gurations of the same weight and of required 
reliability level with more uniform distribution of probabilities 
of failure. Moreover, modelling of ship structural components by 
events and using the event oriented system analysis appears as a 
complex but feasible task that provides more information about 
behaviour of ship structures under complex service conditions 
with a number of operational states and failure types.
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